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In an early passage from A Theory of Justice, Rawls suggests that not only will
moral and political philosophy “involve principles and theoretical constructions
which go much beyond the norms and standards cited in everyday life,” but they
may “eventually require fairly sophisticated mathematics as well.”1 This second
claim would Vnd assent among only a small minority of political theorists and
philosophers today (or then), if the near total absence of mathematics from the
discipline is any guide. But why should this be so? Many political theorists, in
∗Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia. Email: ingham@uga.edu.
†I am grateful to Lucas Stanczyk and two anonymous reviewers for carefully reading and
suggesting improvements to earlier versions of the manuscript. Any remaining mistakes are my
own.
1Rawls (1971, 47). Interestingly, these remarks were preserved in the 1999 revised edition,
even though Rawls chose to remove the next sentence: “This is to be expected, since on the
contract view the theory of justice is part of the theory of rational choice” (Rawls, 1999, 41, 42).
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particular those who see themselves as occupying the more “analytical” wing of
the discipline, consider the careful deVnition of terms and the construction of
deductive arguments as an important part of their craft. It would be surprising
if mathematics never had a useful role to play in political theory, given this
understanding of the enterprise.
This essay presents an example of how political theory can beneVt from
mathematics, i.e., formal deVnitions and deductive reasoning. I begin in the next
section with observations on Phillip Pettit’s recent account of popular control.
These observations are the stuU of “conventional” political theory—I claim he
conWates two distinct conditions in his conception of popular control—and they
neither require nor beneVt (much) from formal constructions. But they raise
questions that would be all but impossible to answer without formal deVnitions
and arguments. In section 3, I present formal deVnitions that facilitate this in-
quiry. In section 4, the inquiry proceeds through increasingly denser thickets
of logical complexity, culminating in a theorem that is similar in its underlying
logical structure to theorems on preference-aggregation, like the famous theo-
rems of Arrow or Gibbard and Satterthwaite: popular control, as Pettit models
it, implies that either the government is sometimes perversely responsive to cit-
izens’ normative attitudes or there is a single citizen whose normative attitudes
unilaterally Vx—in the manner of a “dictator”—government policy.
The argument requires only elementary mathematical concepts, like that of
a set and a function, so it is not a display of “sophisticated” mathematics per




Pettit (2013) oUers a novel republican theory and model of democracy. The the-
ory consists of an account of popular control over government, which Pettit
argues is necessary for non-domination and legitimacy. The model is meant to
show how a certain kind of deliberative democracy could establish popular con-
trol. But the theory and model seem to operate with distinct interpretations of
popular control. The theory sets up an ideal of popular control that is more strin-
gent and demanding than the form of popular control that the model describes
as feasible, or so I will argue.
Pettit’s general notion of control takes it to be inWuence that imposes a di-
rection or pattern on a process. For example, when I cause chaos by standing in
the middle of an intersection waving my hands, I inWuence but do not control
the Wow of traXc; when the police oXcer does the same, his inWuence imposes
a pattern on the Wow of traXc and can therefore be described as control (Pettit,
2013, 154). Popular control must involve both “popular inWuence and popular
direction” (Pettit, 2013, 168). When Pettit describes the kind of popular control
required for non-domination and legitimacy, he argues that “people should share
equally both in exercising inWuence over government and in determining what
direction that inWuence is to impose” (Pettit, 2013, 169). This latter requirement
means that “the direction their inWuence imposes [. . . ] is required to be one that
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each is ready to accept.” Pettit adds an important clariVcation in a footnote to
the claim:
Saying that something is acceptable often has normative signiV-
cance [. . . ], implying that it is such that people ought to accept
it. Here and throughout this book, the word has a non-normative
sense, implying that the object or policy or whatever is such that
people are disposed to accept it; they Vnd it acceptable, as we say
(Pettit, 2013, 170).
Pettit discusses other conditions that a system of popular control must satisfy,
if it is to eliminate or minimize citizens’ domination by the state, but my focus
will be on his idea that it must involve a system of inWuence that “[gives] the
state an equally acceptable direction—that is, a direction that [citizens] are all
actually disposed to accept” (Pettit, 2013, 170).
One might doubt how this condition could ever be met. For any “direction”
to policy-making, surely there will always be at least one citizen who is not
disposed to accept it. Pettit acknowledges that the requirement of universal
acceptability “may not be satisVable amongst fanatics or zealots who insist on
special treatment: say, the privileging of their religion or ethnicity.” But it can be
satisVed, he holds, among citizens “who are willing to live on equal terms with
others” (Pettit, 2013, 170). Restricting in this manner the set of people to whom
the direction of government must be acceptable goes some way towards meeting
the worry. But only some. It is not obvious why some mutually acceptable
direction of policy should be assumed to exist in a diverse society divided by
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class and other cleavages, even if we assume that everyone wishes to live on
equal terms with each other. Why should we expect there to be a direction that
policy-making could take which every citizen—the Christian fundamentalist as
well as the secular liberal, the hedge fund manager as well as the assembly-line
worker—will be disposed to accept, even granting that they are all prepared to
live on equal terms with each other? What sharpens the point of this question
is the non-normative meaning of “acceptable.” As Pettit stresses in the footnote
quoted above, what matters is not whether there is a direction that everyone
who is willing to live on equal terms with others should be ready to accept.
Rather, what matters is whether there is a direction that everyone who is willing
to live on equal terms with others is ready to accept.
That “acceptability” has a non-normative meaning in Pettit’s interpretation
of popular control is in itself a virtue. Control over something should make
it sensitive to one’s actual attitudes, not the attitudes that one ought to have.
But the worry is that these truth-conditions of “acceptable to citizen k” combine
with the universal quantiVer (“every citizen k”) to make Pettit’s formulation of
popular control an impossible ideal.
Indeed, when Pettit turns to the model of a deliberative democracy that is
meant to illustrate the feasibility of popular control, he shifts towards a less
demanding requirement. The model shows how a system of popular inWuence
might succeed at imposing a direction on policy-making that is consistent with
universally accepted policy-making norms. As I explain below, this weaker con-
straint may be satisVed even if not everyone Vnds the direction of policy accept-
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able. In fact, it can be satisVed even if everyone Vnds the direction of policy
unacceptable.
In Pettit’s model of democracy, the mechanism underlying popular control
is deliberation governed by “a norm to the eUect that participants should only
oUer considerations for or against a policy that all can regard as relevant.”
The idea is that any considerations adduced should help to make the
policy acceptable to everyone, given shared assumptions about the
dispositions of each. . . The considerations adduced should count as
relevant according to everyone’s views but according to everyone’s
views as they actually are or can be brought to be, not according to
everyone’s views as in some sense they ought ideally to be.
. . . The only considerations they can invoke are ones that argue on
all sides – though perhaps with a varying force or weight – for
accepting the policy supported; they must count with everyone as
grounds that it is at least relevant or pertinent to adduce in arguing
for or against a policy (Pettit, 2013, 253, 254).
Where this deliberative norm is in place, “it will force people to interact in
a manner that gives rise to shared policy-making norms.” Even where there
are partisan divides over policy, “the requirement for the parties on each side
to defend their partisan proposals in multi-partisan terms ensures that as they
construct their diUerent programmes, they will lay down a foundation of com-
mon ground between them.” The partisan dissensus “will secure or reinforce the
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norms of argument that the disagreement drives the diUerent sides to identify”
(Pettit, 2013, 261).
Gradually, generally accepted policy-making norms should emerge as a re-
sult of this kind of deliberation, and under the right conditions—the right demo-
cratic institutions and culture—these norms should constrain policy. Their con-
straining eUect should ensure that two conditions are fulVlled.
First, a policy-condition: no policies are left on the table as possible
candidates for adoption in any domain, if they are in violation of the
norms. And second, a process-condition: no process for selecting
between candidates that survive that Vrst cut – and no process for
selecting between rival processes – is employed, if its employment
in that domain would be in violation of the norms (Pettit, 2013, 265).
Suppose that everything goes according to script, and the government is pre-
vented from choosing any policy that violates any of these generally accepted
public norms of policy-making. The system of popular inWuence imposes a
“norm-complying” direction on policy-making, a direction that complies with
all universally accepted policy-making norms. Can we conclude that it has im-
posed a direction that everyone is disposed to accept? We cannot. Some citizens
may not be disposed to accept it even if they agree that it does not violate any
of the publicly recognized, universally accepted policy-making norms.
Some citizens may Vnd a policy-direction unacceptable, even though it re-
spects all publicly recognized, universally accepted policy-making norms, be-
cause it violates principles that they—but not all citizens—accept as binding con-
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straints on government policy. Someone who accepts Rawls’s diUerence prin-
ciple may not be disposed to accept the direction that policy has taken in the
United States over the last forty years. Nonetheless, the direction policy has
taken may be compatible with all those policy-making norms that everyone ac-
cepts. For not everyone accepts the diUerence principle.
In fact, a system of popular inWuence may impose a direction on policy that
complies with all universally accepted policy-making norms, even though no one
is disposed to accept it. For each person, it may violate a policy-making norm
that she, but not everyone, accepts; she may not regard it as acceptable for this
reason; yet there may be no norm which everyone accepts and which condemns
the direction policy has taken.
The model therefore delivers a form of popular control that is diUerent from
what the theory promises. The theory promises a system of popular inWuence
that imposes a direction on policy-making that everyone is disposed to accept;
the model delivers a system of popular inWuence that imposes a direction on
policy-making that is compatible with norms that everyone accepts. The con-
straint on government that Pettit’s theory formulates is not a constraint that the
government in his model of a deliberative democracy need satisfy. Government
may take a direction that satisVes all universally accepted policy-making norms,
but which not everyone is disposed to accept.
One thought that seems to facilitate Pettit’s shift to the weaker requirement
is the thought that all citizens will want government to be forced to comply
with universally accepted policy-making norms. If a system of popular inWu-
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ence has this eUect, the eUect will be welcome—indeed, equally acceptable to
all. As Pettit claims in the concluding pages of his discussion of the model,
“the eUect of a system of popular inWuence in forcing government to comply
with accepted policy-making norms is bound to be equally acceptable to all par-
ticipants” (Pettit, 2013, 280). But this is not the same thing as their inWuence
imposing a direction on government that is acceptable to each. For example, a
student may accept the constraining eUect of university policy on a professor’s
determination of his grade , but not accept the professor’s determination of his
grade. Accepting the constraining eUect of universally accepted norms on the
direction policy takes is not the same as accepting the direction policy takes. Yet,
according to the theory of democracy, the system of popular inWuence “has to
give the state an equally acceptable direction—that is, a direction that [citizens]
are all actually disposed to accept.” It is not enough for it to have a constraining
eUect that all citizens welcome (Pettit, 2013, 170).
So there is the logical gap between the policy-directions compatible with
universally accepted policy-making norms and the policy-directions that are ac-
ceptable to each. The next section explores the implications of this observation
with the help of a formalization of Pettit’s model. The Vrst payoU of the for-
mal model is the insight that changes in citizens’ normative attitudes may have




In this section I present a formal model that consists in set-theoretic deVnitions
of policy-making norms, the norms a citizen accepts, government’s subjection
to these norms, and so on—in short, all of the concepts under discussion in
the previous section. The deVnitions do not invoke any mathematical concepts
other than those of a set, a collection of sets, the intersection of sets, etc. Why
go through the exercise of formalizing Pettit’s model of popular control, if the
model consists in nothing more than set-theoretic deVnitions of the same con-
cepts that Vgure in the non-technical version of the model?
These deVnitions and the symbols for the sets that Vgure in them serve a
purpose similar to that of symbols for arithmetical operations (+, −, etc.). The
proposition that the sum of two numbers, when multiplied by itself, equals the
Vrst number multiplied by itself plus the second number multiplied by itself plus
twice the product of the two numbers is hard to understand, much less evaluate,
when it is expressed in “plain English.” It is easier to understand when expressed
so:
(x+ y)2 = x2 + 2xy + y2.
Just as special symbols are aids in mental computations of products and sums,
the formal representation of norms and policies as sets, and the introduction
of special symbols for these sets, are mental aids that will help us keep track
of the moving parts of questions about popular control. Obviously, not every
question about popular control requires such aids, just as not every arithmetical
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computation requires pen and paper. But, as I hope this section will demonstrate,
there are some questions that hold substantive interest and also exhibit enough
complexity to justify the introduction of the formal model.
These questions are variations on the following: in what sense does popular
control, in the sense of subjection to accepted policy-making norms, imply that
government is responsive to citizens’ normative attitudes? The Vrst beneVt of
the formal model is that it allows us to demonstrate that popular control in
this sense is—in principle—compatible with the government being “responsive”
in a perverse way: as a result of a change in citizens’ attitudes that involves
nothing more than some citizens coming to Vnd the government’s current policy
acceptable, the government may be led to adopt a diUerent policy that these
citizens consider unacceptable.
3.1
We will let X refer to the set of all feasible options open to the government.
(These are the various “directions” which popular inWuence may impose on gov-
ernment.) Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} designate the set of citizens.
A given policy-making norm permits the government to choose some subset
of the options in X . We will therefore represent a policy-making norm by the
subset P ⊆ X of the feasible options that are compatible with it. To take a
simple example, suppose the government faces a choice between three options
aUecting the basic structure of society, X = {x, y, z}, and Rawls’s principle
of fair equality of opportunity is compatible with x and y, but not z. Then,
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within the formal model, the fair equality of opportunity principle is represented
by the subset {x, y}. The set of policy-making norms that a citizen accepts is
then represented as a set of subsets. For example, if Rawls’s diUerence principle
permits only x, then the normative attitudes of the person who accepts just the
diUerence principle and the fair equality principle are represented by the set
{{x}, {x, y}}.
This abstract representation of the norms that a citizen accepts leaves out
a lot of information, but that is the point. The goal is to represent only the
information that is relevant to the following arguments and to leave out any
information that would only clutter the exposition and distract us from what is
driving the conclusions.
For each i ∈ N , we will let Pi denote the collection of sets that represents
the norms that citizen i accepts. To continue with our simple example, suppose
thatN = {1, 2} and citizen 1 accepts the diUerence principle and fair equality of
opportunity principle, but citizen 2 accepts only the fair equality of opportunity
principle. Then we would have:
P1 = {{x}, {x, y}},
P2 = {{x, y}}.
That {x} ∈ P1 means that citizen 1 accepts a norm (the diUerence principle)
which permits only x—equivalently, it rules out any option z such that z 6= x.
That, additionally, {x, y} ∈ P1 means that citizen 1 also accepts a norm (fair
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equality of opportunity) that permits only x or y—equivalently, it rules out any
option z such that z /∈ {x, y}.
If an option x is permitted by every policy-making norm that she accepts,
then I will say that she Vnds it acceptable; if it violates a policy-making norm
she accepts, I will say that she Vnds it unacceptable. Let us assume that each
citizen can identify at least one acceptable option (which is plausible when X
comprises every feasible option, as it does here). Formally, the assumption is
that for each citizen, the intersection of the norms she accepts is nonempty:
∩P∈PiP 6= ∅ for each citizen i ∈ N . Each person’s normative commitments are
jointly compatible with at least one of the feasible options.
The simple example just given illustrates the observation from the previ-
ous section: y is compatible with all universally accepted policy-making norms,
because the only universally accepted norm is {x, y}, the fair equality of oppor-
tunity principle. But citizen 1 is not disposed to accept it because it violates the
diUerence principle, which she accepts.
So far we have simply used this formal set-theoretic language to articulate a
thought that some might consider to have been already satisfactorily expressed
in plain English. Its restatement alone might not justify the eUort of formalizing
Pettit’s model of popular control. Let me now try to make the case that this
exercise yields additional beneVts that do justify it.
I claimed above that the consequence of some citizens coming to Vnd an
option acceptable may be that the government chooses a diUerent option that
they Vnd unacceptable, even if (and partly because) the government is subject to
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popular control as Pettit models it. With the formal model in place, this claim is
easy to verify.
As before, let X = {x, y, z} and N = {1, 2}. Suppose all three options are
compatible with the principle of eXciency, which is therefore represented by
the set X . Fair equality of opportunity and the diUerence principle correspond,
as before, to {x, y} and {x}, respectively. And let us suppose that there is an
additional norm of meritocracy, {y}, which rules out the kind of redistribution
involved in x and permits only y. Suppose that initially the citizens’ normative
attitudes are given by
P1 = {{x, y}, X},
P2 = {{y}, {x, y}, X},
That is, they both accept the principle of eXciency and the principle of fair
equality of opportunity, and citizen 2 also accepts the meritocratic norm. Thus,
the government, being constrained to choose an option compatible with each
universally accepted policy-making norm, is constrained to choose either x or
y.
Let us suppose the government has its own preferences over the three op-
tions, which determine how it chooses when the constraints of popular control
leave it with some discretion: it prefers z to x and prefers both of these to y.
Given its preferences, it chooses x. Note that citizen 2 considers this option
unacceptable, because it violates the norm of meritocracy.
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Now consider a second scenario in which the second citizen—perhaps after
reading Arneson (1999)—has come to reject the meritocratic norm as well as
the fair equality of opportunity principle, but has come to aXrm the diUerence
principle.
P ′1 = {{x, y}, X},
P ′2 = {{x}, X}.
Note that in light of the changes in citizen 2’s normative attitudes, she now ac-
cepts the government’s initial choice of x—indeed, she now considers it uniquely
acceptable—whereas before she considered it unacceptable. But now the only
generally accepted policy-making norm is X , the principle of eXciency. Thus
the government is free to choose z, which it prefers to the other two options.
So the eUect of citizen 2 revising her normative attitudes and coming to regard
x as acceptable—where she previously considered it unacceptable—is that the
government is permitted to choose and does choose z—which she previously
regarded and still regards as unacceptable—instead of x.
That Pettit’s system of norm-based regulation could operate in this manner
raises a question about the plausibility of describing it as a system of popular
control. Not only does norm-based regulation not compel the government to
choose options that everyone Vnds acceptable. But it also allows government
policy to be perversely responsive to changes in citizens’ normative attitudes in
the following sense. The attitudes of the second citizen change and this change
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has an eUect on the government’s choice, but the eUect is unwelcome from citi-
zen 2’s point of view: the outcome would be better, from her point of view, if the
change in her attitudes were to go unregistered. For the new option fares worse
than the old, relative to the normative standards that she now accepts. That
seems like a perverse feature of the relationship between citizens’ normative
attitudes and the object of their putative control. Intuitively, popular control im-
plies responsiveness to citizens’ attitudes, but the object of their control should
never be “negatively” responsive to their attitudes, as it is here.
Now, perhaps it is only in virtue of the government’s preferences, but not its
subjection to norm-based popular control per se, that causes the government’s
chosen option to be perversely responsive in this manner to the change in citi-
zen 2’s normative attitudes. Perhaps subjection to norm-based popular control
would not give rise to this phenomenon if the government had diUerent pref-
erences or faced additional constraints on its choices. After all, in the example
the government could continue to choose x without violating any generally ac-
cepted norm. It refrains from doing so only because of its preference for z,
which is also compatible with accepted norms in the second scenario. In doing
so, it may seem to be violating a second-order policy-making norm concerning
how it should respond to shifts in citizens’ normative attitudes. How might one
formulate the second-order norm that it violates here?
Here is one thought. Let us say that a citizen recognizes a reason for choos-
ing x instead of y if she accepts a norm that permits x but not y. A second-order
norm that might capture the intuition about positive responsiveness is this:
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(Positive responsiveness)Government policy (or its direction) should
not shift from x to y, unless some citizen has either come to recog-
nize a reason for choosing y instead of x or ceased to recognize a
reason for choosing x instead of y.
This condition is equivalent to saying that if citizens’ normative attitudes change,
but no one’s attitudes become more favorable towards y relative to x—that is, no
one has come to recognize a new reason for choosing y instead of x, and no one
has ceased to recognize a reason for choosing x instead of y—then the eUect of
the changes in their normative attitudes cannot be that the government changes
its choice from x to y.2
In the previous example, this second-order norm would prevent the choice
of z in the second scenario if the government chooses x in the Vrst scenario. For
although the citizens’ normative attitudes change, there is no citizen who comes
to recognize a reason for choosing z instead of x and no citizen who ceases
to recognize a reason for choosing x instead of z. The Vrst citizen’s attitudes
do not change. The second citizen still recognizes every reason for choosing x
instead of z that she recognized before—namely the fair equality of opportunity
principle, {x, y}. And she has not come to recognize any reason for choosing
z instead of x—there is no new norm P such that she accepts P in the second
scenario (P ∈ P ′2) even though she did not accept it in the Vrst (P /∈ P2) and
that rules out x but not z (z ∈ P but x /∈ P ). Positive responsiveness therefore
2In other words, positive responsiveness means that the condition following unless in the def-
inition is a necessary—but not necessarily suXcient—condition for government policy shifting
from x to y.
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requires that the government not choose z, given that it chose x in the Vrst
scenario. (It also requires that it not choose y.)
In this example, it is possible for the government to respect this second-
order norm at the same time that it respects every generally accepted Vrst-order
policy-making norm; it satisVes both constraints if it chooses x in both sce-
narios. But how can we know whether it is possible in general to satisfy both
constraints? That is, how can we be sure that the mutual satisVability of these
two constraints is not due to special features of the examples? An extension of
the formal model will help us answer this question.
3.2
In this section I add to the existing model a representation of how citizens’ nor-
mative attitudes inWuence the direction of government, that is, its choice from
the (Vnite) set of options,X . This addition will allow us to determine whether it
is possible in general for a government to be both subject to generally accepted
public norms and positively responsive to changes in citizens’ attitudes. The
conclusion will be that if X contains at least three options, then a government
subject to norm-based popular control is positively responsive to changes in
citizens’ normative attitudes only if there is some citizen—a “dictator”—whose
attitudes can unilaterally determine government’s behavior.
Since positive responsiveness concerns the manner in which citizens’ nor-
mative attitudes inWuence government policy (or the direction of government),
it will be useful to incorporate a representation of this relationship into the
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model. Each citizen’s normative attitudes are represented by a (non-empty) col-
lection of subsets of X such that the subsets have a non-empty intersection.3
Let P denote the set of all such collections.4 A full speciVcation of all citizens’
normative attitudes is therefore an n-tuple P = (P1,P2, . . . ,Pn) ∈ Pn. The
causal relationship between the government’s choice and citizens’ normative
attitudes—the manner in which the latter inWuence the former—can be repre-
sented as a function g : Pn → X , where g(P) ∈ X is the option chosen when
citizens’ normative attitudes are P = (P1,P2, . . . ,Pn). Positive responsiveness
and norm-based popular control can now be expressed as conditions that this
function may or may not satisfy.
DeVnition 1 (positive responsiveness). A causal relationship g : P → X satis-
Ves positive responsiveness if, for all P ,P ′ ∈ Pn and x, y ∈ X , if g(P) = x and
g(P ′) = y, then there is some i ∈ N such that either
(i) there is a Q ∈ P ′i with y ∈ Q and x /∈ Q, but for all P ∈ Pi, y ∈ P only if
x ∈ P ; or
(ii) there is a Q ∈ Pi with x ∈ Q and y /∈ Q, but for all P ∈ P ′i , x ∈ P only if
y ∈ P .
This is just a restatement of the previous deVnition of positive responsive-
ness. In words, government policy only changes from x to y if there is some
3Recall the assumption from the previous section that each citizen can always identify one
option as acceptable.
4For example, if X = {a, b}, then P contains Vve elements: {{a}}, {{b}}, {X}, {{a}, X},
and {{b}, X}.
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citizen who either (i) has come to accept a norm that permits y but not x (where
she previously accepted no such norm); or (ii) no longer accepts a norm that
permits x but not y (where she previously did accept some such norm). That is,
the government’s choice changes from x to y only if some citizen has either (i)
come to recognize a reason for choosing y instead of x or (ii) ceased to recognize
a reason for choosing x instead of y.
DeVnition 2 (norm-based popular control). A causal relationship g : Pn → X
satisVes norm-based popular control if, for all P ∈ Pn, we have g(P) ∈ P
whenever P ∈ Pi for all i ∈ N .
We wish to know whether there is any function g : Pn → X that satisVes
both of these conditions. The answer is that, if there are at least three options
in X , then g satisVes norm-based popular control and positive responsiveness
only if it is “dictatorial” in the sense of the following deVnition.
DeVnition 3 (dictatorship). A causal relationship g : Pn → X is dictatorial if
there is some k ∈ N such that g(P) ∈ ∩P∈PkP for all P ∈ Pn.
Suppose there is a “dictator”: a citizen such that, for any speciVcation P of
citizens’ normative attitudes, government policy must be permitted by all of the
norms that she accepts—it must be contained in the intersection of the norms
she accepts. Then, even if everyone else believes some policy x is permissible—
indeed, even if everyone else believes x is uniquely acceptable—the government
will not choose x if x violates one of the norms that the dictator accepts. And
even if everyone else believes some policy x is unacceptable, and they can all
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agree on an acceptable alternative, the government must choose x if the dictator
believes that x is uniquely acceptable. Thus, the power that some single citizen
will have when the relationship g is dictatorial is considerable indeed. As it turns
out, some citizen must have this power if government is positively responsive to
citizens’ normative attitudes and subject to popular control.
Theorem 1. Assume |X| ≥ 3. If g : Pn → X satisVes positive responsiveness
and norm-based popular control, then it is dictatorial.
The interested reader can Vnd a proof of the theorem in the appendix.
No more than one person can be a dictator, so a corollary of the theorem
is that citizens’ normative attitudes have unequal inWuence over government if
the relationship between these attitudes and government policy satisVes popular
control and positive responsiveness.
Like Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the related Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem, the theorem states that a certain kind of aggregation function is “dicta-
torial” if it satisVes other seemingly attractive properties (Arrow, 1951; Gibbard,
1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). In fact, the connection between the theorem and
these results is deeper: as shown in the appendix, the theorem is a logical corol-
lary of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (which can itself be derived from Ar-
row’s theorem). As it is conventionally interpreted, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem answers a question about voting rules—are there non-manipulable vot-
ing rules? On its face, it has nothing to do with the question under examina-
tion here—can government be both positively responsive to citizens’ attitudes
towards policy-making norms and subject to norm-based popular control, as
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Pettit models it? Yet it turns out that the two inquiries are logically linked;
from the answer to the Vrst question one can derive the answer to the second.
This Vnding illustrates a frequent beneVt of formal models: they reveal logical
parallels between seemingly unrelated inquiries. It is also another piece of ev-
idence for an expansive view of the signiVcance of Arrow’s theorem and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: these results are not speciVcally about prefer-
ence aggregation—notwithstanding the story that usually accompanies them—
but rather a more general kind of aggregation problem (Patty and Penn, 2014).
The aggregation of individuals’ dispositions to accept norms is, it appears, one
more example of this more general problem.
What conclusions should we draw from the theorem? We should not reject
Pettit’s interpretation of popular control on the basis of the theorem. For the
positive responsiveness requirement is surely less compelling than either norm-
based popular control or equality. If any of these requirements is shown by the
theorem to be unreasonable, it is the requirement of positive responsiveness.
This requirement was formulated for a purpose, so its rejection comes at a
cost. It was meant to capture the intuitive judgment that a government subject
to popular control should not respond “negatively” to citizens’ attitudes. In the
example from section 3.1, a citizen’s coming to Vnd the government’s current
policy acceptable should not cause the government to change its policy to one
that she considers unacceptable. Positive responsiveness does indeed capture
this intuitive judgement, but it combines with the assumption of norm-based
popular control to yield inegalitarian conclusions. The next question to ask
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is whether there are alternatives to the positive responsiveness property that
would capture our intuitions in this example, or whether the intuitive judgments
are simply misguided. The formal model and theorem should be the point of
departure for future inquiry into such questions.
One might also respond to the theorem by rejecting the assumption—implicit
in this framework as well as Pettit’s model—that popular control over govern-
ment consists in a relationship between government and the policy-making
norms that citizens’ accept. Perhaps it consists instead in a relationship be-
tween the object of popular control and individual-level data that contain more
information than merely which policy-making norms citizens accept. To take
just one possibility, one might argue that popular control consists in a relation-
ship between policy, on the one hand, and citizens’ policy preferences and the
strength with which they hold their preferences, on the other (Ingham, Forth-
coming). As is well-known, one can sometimes escape Arrow-like impossibility
results by enriching the informational environment.5
5.
There are arguably also conclusions to draw, not from the theorem itself but
from the fact that one can get such a theorem once one represents government’s
subjection to accepted norms and its responsiveness to citizens’ normative judg-
ments in terms of sets and functions. The conclusion we should entertain is that
Rawls was right to suggest that mathematics might sometimes have a role to
5For an accessible discussion and references to other literature on the topic, see Sen (2014).
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play in political theory. Is there any plausible understanding of political the-
ory that justiVes skepticism towards Rawls’s conjecture? Is there any plausible
basis for drawing the disciplinary boundaries of political theory so that they en-
compass the non-mathematical arguments of section 2 but exclude the model-
building and theorem-proving exercises of section 3?
In section 2, I argued that Pettit operates with two distinct notions of popular
control. According to one, popular inWuence imposes an equally acceptable di-
rection on policy; according to the other, popular inWuence imposes a direction
on policy that is compatible with universally accepted policy-making norms.
This argument was clearly an exercise—whether or not one judges it successful—
in political theory, or “normative political theory,” as traditionally understood in
Anglophone political science and philosophy departments. Drawing distinctions
between concepts and comparing their implications are political theory’s bread
and butter.
In section 3 I presented a model of norm-based popular control that con-
sisted of formal deVnitions of policy-making norms, citizens’ attitudes towards
them, and the causal relationship between their attitudes and the direction of
government. These deVnitions were “formal” in the sense that they were cast
in terms of sets and functions and introduced special symbols for these abstract
objects. But the aim of the model was much the same as the aim of the non-
mathematical inquiry of the previous section. Throughout the goal was to ex-
plore the implications of government’s subjection to accepted norms. In section
2 we considered—without the help of the model—what this subjection implied
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about the general acceptability of government policy, whereas in section 3 we
considered—with the help of the model—what it implied about the responsive-
ness of government to citizens’ normative attitudes.
Admittedly, the model-building exercise of section 3 does not look like po-
litical theory as traditionally practiced. But its use of special symbols marks
no more than a superVcial diUerence with the intellectual exercise of section 2.
One could rewrite section 3 using only the 26 characters of the alphabet. The
more economical expressions that the special symbols make possible are mental
aids, dispensable in principle but indispensable in practice. Representing claims
about popular control and responsiveness with sets and functions, and introduc-
ing special symbols for these objects, helped us follow and record their logical
implications. What made the model useful was not the presence of numbers—
there was nothing quantitative about our topic. Its utility derived instead from
the logical complexity of the subject matter. If there is a place for this level
of complexity in political theory, then there is a place for formal models and
theorems, too.
Appendix
Theorem 1 can be established by proving that it is a corollary of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite (G-S) theorem.6 Let P denote the set of complete, transitive binary
relations—“preference orderings”—onX . We will refer to generic elements of Pn
with the notation % or %′, using %i to denote the ith component of the n-tuple.
6An alternative, independent proof is available upon request.
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The G-S theorem states that if |X| ≥ 3, there is no function φ : Pn → X that
is strategy-proof, surjective, and non-dictatorial (as deVned below).7 Theorem
1 is a corollary, because its negation implies the existence of such a function,
contrary to the G-S theorem.
To prove this, let us Vrst deVne a function f that maps from Pn toPn. The ith
component of f(%), which we denote by f(%)i, will be deVned as the collection
of sets, {Qji}|X|j=1, constructed as follows:
Q1i := {x ∈ X|∀y ∈ X, x %i y},
and for j = 2, . . . , |X|,
Qji := {x ∈ X|∀y ∈ X \Qj−1i , x %i y}.
Since %i is complete and transitive, Q1i 6= ∅ and Qj−1i ⊆ Qji for j = 2, . . . , |X|
and Qji = X for some j ≤ |X|. (The Vrst set Q1i contains the alternatives tied
for Vrst place; the jth set Qji contains the alternatives tied for j-th place plus all
the higher-ranked alternatives.)
A function φ : Pn → X is said to be strategy-proof if, for any k ∈ N , we have
φ(%) %k φ(%′)
whenever % and %′ are identical with the possible exception of their kth com-
7For a rigorous but accessible statement, proof, and explanation of the theorem, see Austin-
Smith and Banks (2005).
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ponent. It is dictatorial if there is a k ∈ N such that, for all %∈ Pn, φ(%) %k z
for all z ∈ X . It is surjective if for every x ∈ X , there is a %∈ Pn such that
x = φ(%).
Theorem (Gibbard-Satterthwaite). Assume |X| ≥ 3. If φ : Pn → X is surjective
and strategy-proof, then it is dictatorial.
To see the connection between theorem 1 and the G-S theorem, observe that
given functions g : Pn → X and f : Pn → Pn, the composite function g ◦ f ,
deVned by g ◦ f(x) := g(f(x)), maps preference orderings to outcomes inX , so
the G-S theorem tells us that if g ◦ f is strategy-proof and surjective, then it is
dictatorial. Theorem 1 is a corollary of the G-S theorem because it can be shown
that if theorem 1 were false, then there would exist a g : Pn → X such that with
f deVned as above, g ◦ f is strategy-proof, surjective, and non-dictatorial.
Lemma 1. If g : Pn → X satisVes positive responsiveness and popular control but
is not dictatorial, then g ◦ f is strategy-proof and surjective but not dictatorial.
Proof: assume the hypothesis. Let any x ∈ X be given. Take any %∈ Pn such
that, for all i ∈ N , x i z for all z ∈ X \ {x}. Then, {x} ∈ f(%)i for all i ∈ N .
Thus, g(f(%)) = x, by popular control. Hence g ◦ f is surjective.
To see that g ◦ f is not dictatorial, assume the contrary and let k ∈ N be the
dictator. From this assumption we will show that g is dictatorial, contradicting
the hypothesis. To see that k is a dictator under g, we choose an arbitrary
P ′ ∈ Pn and any x ∈ ∩P∈P ′kP and show that g(P ′) ∈ ∩P∈P ′kP . If g(P ′) = x,
we are done, so let g(P ′) = y 6= x. Now consider a %∈ Pn such that x k z and
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z i x for all z ∈ X \ {x} and i ∈ N \ {k}. Since g ◦ f is assumed dictatorial,
g(f(%)) = x. But now, by positive responsiveness of g, there must be some
j ∈ N such that either (i) there is a Q ∈ P ′j such that y ∈ Q and x /∈ Q, but
for all P ∈ f(%)j , y ∈ P only if x ∈ P ; or (ii) there is a Q ∈ f(%)j such
that x ∈ Q and y /∈ Q, but for all P ∈ P ′j , x ∈ P only if y ∈ P . From the
speciVcation of% and the deVnition of f , we know that neither (i) nor (ii) is true
of any j ∈ N \ {k}. From x ∈ ∩P∈P ′kP , we know (i) is not true of k. So we
conclude that (ii) is true of k. But this means g(P ′) = y ∈ ∩P∈P ′kP , because
x ∈ ∩P∈P ′kP . Thus, k is a dictator under g, yielding the desired contradiction
and proving that g ◦ f is not dictatorial.
To show that g ◦ f is strategy-proof, let any two %,%′∈ Pn be given such
that %i=%′i for all i 6= k. We wish to show that g(f(%)) %k g(f(%′)). If
g(f(%)) = g(f(%′)), we are done, so assume g(f(%)) = x and g(f(%′)) = y
(x 6= y). Then, by positive responsiveness and the fact that %i=%′i for all i 6= k,
it must be that either (i) for all P ∈ f(%)k, y ∈ P only if x ∈ P ; or (ii) there is
a Q ∈ f(%)k with x ∈ Q but y /∈ Q. In either case, the deVnition of f implies
that x %k y. Hence, g ◦ f is strategy-proof.
Theorem 1 now follows from the lemma and the G-S theorem.
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